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• A series of major international ﬁnancial crises in the
1990s, coupled with the recent introduction of the euro
in Europe, have led to renewed interest in alternative
exchange rate systems.
• The choice of exchange rate regime is particularly relevant
for emerging-market countries, because other countries
are perceived either as having no alternative to their
current exchange rate arrangement or as highly unlikely
to make a signiﬁcant change.
• This article examines the evolution of exchange rate
regimes in emerging markets over the past decade and
compares the strengths and weaknesses of the various
available systems.
• Experience suggests that intermediate regimes, such as
the adjustable pegged exchange rate that was popular
throughout much of the post–war period, are prone to
instability and several other deﬁciencies.
• Some observers have suggested that, in a world of
increasing international capital mobility, only the two
extreme exchange rate regimes—either a permanently
ﬁxed or a freely ﬂoating exchange rate regime—are likely
to be sustainable. However, these extreme regimes often
pose serious problems for emerging-market economies.
• Two recently proposed alternatives may warrant serious
consideration. The Managed Floating Plus (MFP) and the
Baskets, Bands, and Crawling Pegs (BBC) regimes try to
combine the best elements of both the ﬂexible and ﬁxed
exchange rate systems. The more promising of these two
alternatives from an emerging-market perspective would
seem to be the MFP.
he choice of exchange rate regime has been
a subject of ongoing debate in international
economics. This debate has been renewed in
recent years because of two main factors.
First, unsustainable exchange rate regimes were widely
perceived to have been one of the causes in a series of
economic crises, including the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism (ERM) crisis in 1992, the Mexican peso crisis in
1994–95, and the Asian crisis in 1997–98. This has led
someeconomiststosuggestthat,inaworldofincreasing
international capital mobility, only the two extreme
exchange rate regimes are likely to be sustainable—
either a permanently ﬁxed exchange rate regime (i.e.,
a “hard ﬁx”) such as a currency board or monetary
union, or a freely ﬂoating exchange rate regime. This
proposition, known as the hollowing-out hypothesis,
or the bipolar view, is gaining popularity. It is not,
however,universallyaccepted.Indeed,someeconomists
believe that intermediate regimes such as the adjusta-
ble pegged exchange rate will continue to be a viable
option, especially for emerging markets. Second, cer-
tain experiments with new arrangements over the past
decade, such as the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), dollarization inEcuador andEl Salvador,
and currency boards in Hong Kong and Estonia, have
reinforced the view that hard ﬁxes may be the best
exchange rate arrangement for some countries.
Although the choice of exchange rate regime is a topic
of interest for all countries, it is considered particu-
larly relevant for emerging markets, because other
countries are perceived either as having no alternative
to their current exchange rate arrangement or as highly
unlikely to make a signiﬁcant change. The former
group, those with no viable alternative, includes coun-
tries that are either too small or too underdeveloped to
entertain other options; the latter, those who are
unlikely to change, are mainly industrialized countries
that have tended to settle at one of the two extremes—
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either opting for a freely floating currency or moving to
a common currency such as the euro.
Emerging markets are also regarded as an interesting
group by those who hold the bipolar view because
these markets are in the process of integrating into
globalcapitalmarketsandarethusviewedaspotentially
being drawn towards one of the two poles. The choice
of exchange rate regime for emerging markets is thus
receiving more attention, both in the literature and in
policy circles. In this article, we review the evolution
of exchange rate regimes in emerging markets over
the past decade, discussing the factors that deter-
mine how such countries make their choices and
examining the available options.
Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes
in Emerging Markets
Proponents of the bipolar view, including Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995) and Eichengreen (1998), predict that
countries that have integrated, or are integrating, their
domestic capital markets with global capital markets
will be unable to sustain intermediate regimes and
will be forced to choose one of the two extremes:
either a hard fix or a freely floating exchange rate
regime. In their opinion, the middle ground—made
up of adjustable (soft) pegs—will eventually vanish
for countries that are open to international capital
ﬂows. Other authors, however, disagree. Williamson
(2000), for example, believes that intermediate regimes
are, and will continue to be, a viable option for emerging
markets. Masson (2001) has tested the bipolar hypoth-
esis directly, using historical data, and ﬁnds that inter-
mediate regimes are no more likely to disappear than
freely ﬂoating or ﬁrmly ﬁxed exchange rate systems.
This section reviews the evidence supporting the
bipolar hypothesis, looking at the evolution of
exchange rate regimes in emerging markets over the
past decade.
Fischer (2001) documented the case for the bipolar
view by examining the evolution of exchange rate
regimes in a large sample of countries over the 1990s.
His evidence identifies a trend away from intermediate
regimes and towards ﬂoating regimes, but does not go
so far as to suggest that the middle is vanishing,
except for industrialized countries.1 Of the 185 countries
in the sample, one-third had intermediate regimes in
1999, down from nearly two-thirds (62%) in 1991. Yet
1.   Indeed, as is discussed in more detail on p. 21, almost all industrialized
countries have exchange rate regimes at one of the two extremes.
despite this substantial decrease in the number of
countries with intermediate regimes throughout the
1990s, there is currently no evidence to suggest that
they are about to disappear. Hard ﬁxes also became
more popular throughout the 1990s, largely due to the
creation of the EMU. Notwithstanding this unique
event, hard ﬁxes only increased from 16 per cent to
24 per cent of total regimes over the 1990s. In emerging-
market countries, intermediate regimes declined from
64 per cent to 42 per cent, whereas ﬂoating regimes
increased from 30 per cent to 48 per cent; the remain-
ing 10 per cent were hard ﬁxes. Thus, in 1999, there
were almost as many intermediate regimes as there
were ﬂoating regimes in emerging markets.
Fischer’s work, like most of the studies in this litera-
ture, is based on the so-called “ofﬁcial classiﬁcation”
of exchange rate regimes. The ofﬁcial classiﬁcation
usesinformationcollectedbytheInternationalMonetary
Fund (IMF) and relies on self-identiﬁcation by member
countries.2 No effort is made, however, to ensure that
this de jure classiﬁcation is consistent with actual prac-
tice. As a consequence, the ofﬁcial classiﬁcation suf-
fers from important measurement problems that have
been well documented in the literature. Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (1999), for example,  found that
26 per cent of the countries they examined follow an
exchange rate arrangement that is different from their
de jure regime. Calvo and Reinhart (2002), using more
traditional economic analysis and taking into account
movements in commodity prices, arrive at a similar
conclusion. They focus on countries that ofﬁcially
claim to be on a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, and
ﬁnd that, in most cases, these countries have not
allowed their exchange rate to float freely. They interpret
their ﬁndings as evidence of “fear of ﬂoating.”
Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault (2001) developed an
alternative classiﬁcation scheme that they believe bet-
ter reﬂects the degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility in
emerging markets. This classiﬁcation scheme is based
on volatility in the observed nominal exchange rate
and takes into account external shocks and revalua-
tions. They, too, ﬁnd substantial differences in how
exchange rate regimes are classiﬁed, depending on
which methodology is used. Finally, Reinhart and
Rogoff (2002) reclassify exchange rate regimes by
focusing on market-determined parallel exchange
rates; their results also suggest the presence of meas-
urement error in the ofﬁcial classiﬁcation. In general,
2.   The IMF publishes this classiﬁcation every year in its Annual Report(s) on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (IMF 1960–2000).19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
studies using alternative classiﬁcation schemes tend
to ﬁnd less hollowing out of the intermediate regimes
than studies based on the ofﬁcial classiﬁcation.
In summary, although the evidence to date shows that
the popularity of intermediate regimes  declined in
the 1990s, it is unclear at this point whether they are in
the process of becoming extinct. In our view, the
strongest evidence for the bipolar view comes from
the industrialized countries, where most have
adopted exchange rate regimes at one of the two
extremes. For emerging markets, however, intermediate
regimes remain a popular choice—though less so than
a decade ago. Of course, any analysis of the evolution
of exchange rate regimes in emerging markets must be
interpreted with caution, given the measurement
problems noted above.3
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in
Emerging Markets
Central to the debate over the choice of exchange rate
regime is the question of whether countries are free to
choose any regime they want, or whether they are
instead forced to adopt a particular regime or to choose
among a limited number of options. Various factors
may inﬂuence which options are available to a partic-
ular country. The literature examining the determi-
nants of the choice of exchange rate regime in emerging
markets has emphasized the following factors: inter-
national ﬁnancial market integration, macroeconomic
performance, financial sector development, and
political economy considerations.
A recurring theme in the literature is that countries
withimportantlinkstoglobal ﬁnancial markets cannot
sustain a pegged exchange rate and must choose
either a hard ﬁx or a ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
This belief is linked to the “impossible trinity,” which
stipulates that a country can choose any two of the
following goals, but not all three: a pegged exchange
rate, monetary policy independence, and inter-
national financial market integration. A country that
tries to achieve the impossible trinity will eventually
be forced off its pegged exchange rate or have to
sacriﬁce one of the other two elements. In the 1990s,
many countries with ﬁxed but adjustable exchange
rate regimes were forced to abandon them because the
regimes had become unsustainable, and a costly
3. The IMF’s recognition that there are problems with the ofﬁcial classiﬁcation
is reﬂected in their recent efforts to revise it (IMF 1999).
currency crisis ensued. The economic and social
consequences of these crises have been considerable,
particularly when the currency crisis was associated
with a banking crisis.4 In this regard, it is important to
note that emerging markets that maintained greater
exchange rate ﬂexibility generally fared better than
those with pegged arrangements (IMF 2000: 21).
The desirability of an exchange rate regime, however,
should be based on how it performs throughout good
times and bad, and not just during a crisis. Although
economic theory suggests that the nature of the
exchange rate regime may inﬂuence macroeconomic
performance, the theory yields few clear-cut predic-
tions. Empirical research in this area has focused on
the possible effects of exchange rate regimes on output
variability, inﬂation performance, and economic
growth. Ghosh et al. (1997) found no systematic differ-
ences in growth rates or output volatility across
exchange rate regimes in a sample of 136 countries
over the period 1960–90. Inﬂation, in contrast, tended
to be lower and less volatile in ﬁxed as opposed to
ﬂexible exchange rate regimes5—a result conﬁrmed
by the IMF (1997) when it extended the period of anal-
ysis to the mid-1990s.6 Two recent papers that develop
alternative classiﬁcation schemes, however, ﬁnd evi-
dence linking exchange rate regimes and growth. Bail-
liu, Lafrance, and Perrault (2001), in their study of 25
emerging-market economies over the period 1973–98,
uncovered evidence that more ﬂexible exchange rate
arrangements are associated with higher economic
growth, but only for countries that are relatively open
to international capital ﬂows and, to a lesser extent,
have well-developed ﬁnancial markets. Similarly,
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) found that less-
ﬂexible exchange rate regimes are associated with
slower growth in developing countries; for industrial-
ized countries, they found that the regime type has no
signiﬁcant impact on growth.
4.   By one estimate, the direct ﬁnancial cost to governments of resolving
banking crises in developing countries over the period 1980–95 amounted to
approximately US$250 billion (Honohan 1997). In more than a dozen of these
cases, the cost to the public sector to resolve the crisis amounted to 10 per cent
or more of the country’s GDP, and exceeded this level for the countries most
affected by the Asian crisis (Goldstein et al. 2000, 2). The macroeconomic costs
of currency crises have also been signiﬁcant. Goldstein et al. (2000, 88) found
that it can take from two to three years for economic growth to return to its
pre–crisis average.
5.  Whether this is because ﬁxed exchange rates reduce volatility, or simply
that low-volatility countries tend to choose ﬁxed exchange rates, is unclear.
6.   The latter study, however, did not control for other determinants of
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All of these studies are based on a tripartite classiﬁca-
tion scheme that distinguishes between ﬁxed, inter-
mediate, and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. In this
classiﬁcation scheme, however, two of the categories
(intermediate and ﬂexible) characterize only the
exchange rate regime, whereas the third (ﬁxed) char-
acterizes both the exchange rate regime and the mone-
tary policy framework because, in the latter, the
exchange rate is the target of monetary policy. The
failure to account for this discrepancy may result in an
inaccurate assessment of the effects of alternative
exchangerateregimesonmacroeconomicperformance.
Laidler (1999, 2002) has written extensively on this
issue and notes that a ﬂoating exchange rate, in itself,
does not constitute a “coherent monetary order.”
Absent a nominal anchor, such as a medium-term
inﬂation target, there is nothing to ground inﬂation
expectations or to condition monetary policy actions.
It is therefore not surprising in these situations that
ﬂoating exchange rates fail to deliver some of the
expected beneﬁts.
Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault . . .
found that it is the presence of a
strong monetary policy framework,
rather than the type of exchange rate
regime per se, that is important for
economic growth.
Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault (2002) addressed this
issue by reﬁning their classiﬁcation scheme to account
for different monetary policy frameworks. They
examined the impact of exchange rate arrangements
on growth using a panel-data set of 60 countries over
the period 1973–98 and found that it is the presence of
a strong monetary policy framework, rather than the
type of exchange rate regime per se, that is important
for economic growth.
The literature has also focused on ﬁnancial sector
development as an important determinant in the
choice of exchange rate regime. A sound and well-
developed ﬁnancial sector is often considered an
important precondition for any country that wants
to ﬂoat, since ﬂexible exchange rates are generally
associated with increased volatility in the nominal
exchange rate. And the latter can have damaging
effects on the real economy unless the ﬁnancial sector
is able to absorb exchange rate shocks and provide
agents with appropriate hedging instruments.7
Many emerging-market economies have shallow capital
markets, and thus may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to manage a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime. Indeed, some authors
(Aizenman and Hausmann 2000) argue that, because
of the state of their ﬁnancial markets, the gains from
ﬁxing the exchange rate may be greater for emerging
markets than for industrialized countries. However,
the combination of an underdeveloped financial sector
and a ﬁxed exchange rate regime can also be problem-
atic, since it can result in a banking crisis. As Chang
and Velasco (2000) argue, a hard fix may make a balance-
of-payments crisis less likely only by making a bank-
ing crisis more likely. Eichengreen and Hausmann
(1999) suggest that ﬁnancial markets characterized by
“original sin” can be problematic under both ﬁxed
and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. The term original
sin is used to denote a country that is unable to borrow
abroad (or even long term in its own domestic market),
using instruments denominated in its domestic cur-
rency, owing to a history of poor macroeconomic poli-
cies (hence the original sin). As a result, all long-term
domestic investments in such an economy will be
characterized either by a currency mismatch or a
maturity mismatch. Eichengreen and Hausmann
recommend that economies characterized by original
sin may want to consider dollarization.8
Political economy considerations are sometimes also a
factor in the choice of exchange rate regime. Political
economytheoriessuggestthatacountrylackingpolitical
stability has an incentive, ceteris paribus, to let its
exchange rate float, since it will be difficult for the
government to gather support for the unpopular
measures that may be required to defend a peg
(Poirson 2001). On the other hand, some countries
may be forced to ﬁx to or adopt a hard currency if they
have lost all credibility in conducting monetary policy.
This argument was put forward by those in favour of
dollarization in the Ecuadorean case. In cases like this,
7.   Bordo and Flandreau (2001) ﬁnd evidence for the post–Bretton Woods
period that suggests that countries with more developed ﬁnancial systems
tend to have ﬂoating exchange rate regimes.
8. Dollarization is the modern term for arrangements where the currency of a
major industrial country (e.g., the United States) is used as the national cur-
rency, serving as a unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value.21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
the best, and sometimes the only, option may be to “tie
the hands” of the central bank or government by
importing the credible monetary policy of another
country.
What Options Are Available?
Lessons from industrialized countries
One strategy that emerging markets might consider in
choosing an exchange rate system is to trade on the
experience of industrialized countries. Guidance from
these countries’ experiences concerning the most
promising alternatives might allow emerging markets
to avoid some of the pitfalls that the industrialized
countries encountered in their search for a viable
system.
WiththeexceptionofDenmark,every
country currently classiﬁed by the
IMF as industrialized now operates
under either a freely ﬂoating
exchange rate system or a full
currency union.
The principal lesson that a country might take from
such an exercise is that intermediate solutions are no
longer practicable, and that only the two extremes
should be considered. Indeed, with the exception of
Denmark, every country currently classiﬁed by the
IMF as industrialized now operates under either a
freely ﬂoating exchange rate system or a full currency
union. Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States are prime examples of the former, while
the 12 European countries constituting the EMU are
obvious examples of the latter. The middle ground, as
represented by the system of adjustable pegs established
under the Bretton Woods system, has been shown to
be inherently unstable. While it was originally viewed
as a promising compromise that combined the best
elements of ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate systems,
it was ultimately shown to offer the worst of both
worlds. Necessary adjustments in parity values were
invariably delayed, imposing signiﬁcant costs on the
deﬁcit country and its trading partners, and in addi-
tion invited one-sided, destabilizing speculation.
Although many emerging markets appear to have
opted for similar, Bretton Woods-style solutions,
pegged exchange rates have few defenders. They are
viewed by many as—at best—a useful stop-gap
measure, suitable only for countries that ultimately
hope to shift to a more stable and permanent arrange-
ment. Rogoff (1998) has likened pegged exchange rate
systems to “lightning rods” that attract financial crises.
He, and several other authors, have noted that the
half-life of a pegged exchange rate is typically less
than a year, and that few survive longer than three
years without a major collapse. In short, intermediate
regimes based on the concept of ﬁxed yet adjustable
parities do not appear very promising, except as a
temporary expedient.
Lessons from very small economies
Although the earlier experiences of industrialized
countries are instructive, some observers have sug-
gested that they have limited applicability for other
economies. Some developing economies, for example,
are so small and open that they have very little choice
with regard to the exchange rate system under which
they operate. They lack the institutions and infrastruc-
ture necessary to conduct an effective monetary policy,
and they are also unable to beneﬁt from the insulating
properties of a ﬂexible exchange rate, owing to the
specialized nature of their output and their depend-
ence on imports. The microeconomic advantages that
these economies realize from a ﬁxed exchange rate, in
the form of lower transactions costs and reduced
exchange rate risk, more than outweigh any macro-
economic beneﬁts they might gain from a ﬂexible
exchange rate in terms of increased monetary policy
independence and protection from external shocks.
Economies in this situation almost always opt for dol-
larization (see footnote 8), which is an extreme form of
exchange-rate ﬁxing. At latest count, more than 50
small economies, dependencies, and protectorates
now operate under dollarization (Rose 2000). Frankel
and Rose (2002) suggest that the net beneﬁts of adopt-
ing another country’s currency can be substantial, as
measured by the resulting growth in international
trade and national income. Although their results
have been questioned by several authors, and are
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small,9 Frankel and Rose found that dollarized econo-
mies had bilateral trade ﬂows that were, on average,
300 per cent higher than economies that continued to
use their own currencies.
The dangers of a hard ﬁx: Dollarization and
currency boards
Based on this experience, a strong case could be made
for ﬁrmly ﬁxing the exchange rates of all emerging
countries—if not completely dollarizing the entire
developing world. Unfortunately, there is reason to
believe that the payoffs from pursuing such a strategy
would be substantially smaller than those reported by
Frankel and Rose—especially for emerging markets
that are larger and more developed than those
described above. These economies, unlike the ones
studied by Frankel and Rose, have more discretion
with regard to the currency arrangement they choose;
it is not forced upon them. They also have more to
lose, in terms of forgone independence and insulation
from external shocks, if they opt for a ﬁrmly ﬁxed
exchange rate.
As far as the possibility of a monetary union is con-
cerned,fewemergingmarketshavethekindofpolitical
or economic inﬂuence that the 12 members of the EMU
do, which allows the latter to operate as full partners
in a monetary union, sharing in policy decisions as
well as the seigniorage that accrues from issuing cur-
rency.10 Hence dollarization is the only “hard ﬁx”
option that most emerging markets have available.
Emerging markets that decide to dollarize, however,
lose any monetary policy independence they might
have had under more ﬂexible arrangements. Interest
rate and credit decisions will be made by the lead
country, taking its own economic interests into
account, and ignoring any adverse consequences
these decisions might have for those who have chosen
to use its money. This does not represent a serious
cost, if policy independence has been abused in the
past and the domestic authorities have lost all credi-
bility. In situations like this, the loss of independence
and the ability to “import” someone else’s policy is an
obvious beneﬁt.
9. Many of the economies in the Frankel and Rose study have populations of
less than 100,000.
10. While a number of developing countries have formed their own currency
unions (for example, the Communauté Financière Africaine [CFA] franc zone
in Africa or the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union  in the Caribbean), they
have no effective control over monetary policy within the union because their
currencies are tied to the currency of a major trading partner outside the cur-
rency union.
The difﬁculty associated with reversing the dollariza-
tion regime is both one of its major attractions and its
largest cost. Although the immediate improvement in
policy credibility and the reduction in currency risk
can be signiﬁcant, the dollarized economy effectively
forfeits any right to regain control of its own monetary
destiny. The resulting increase in macroeconomic
adjustment costs could be substantial. The short-run
cyclical movements of the industrialized country
whose currency has been imported are likely to be
quite different than those of the emerging market. In
addition, the two economies are, by deﬁnition, at very
different stages of development and will have to
confront different structural pressures over time.
Without a ﬂoating exchange rate to accommodate
these tensions and to offset some of the shocks, the
burden of adjustment will fall largely on domestic
prices and wages, which are seldom sufficiently
ﬂexible (at least in a downward direction) to ease the
adjustment process.11
The emerging market also sacriﬁces any seigniorage it
would have earned in future years by issuing its own
currency (a form of zero-interest debt), as well as its
ability to serve as an effective lender of last resort.
Many countries without an efﬁcient tax system rely on
seigniorage for a signiﬁcant part of their government
revenue, and unless the industrialized country is will-
ing to share its seigniorage, other measures will have
to be introduced to make up the shortfall. Without the
ability to generate liquidity on demand, the emerging
economy will also find it difficult to provide emergency
assistance to its domestic banks and ﬁnancial markets
whentheyfacespeculativepressures.Itsonlyalternative
will be to draw down existing foreign reserves, or
issue additional debt in the foreign currency. If the
emerging market has a solid credit rating, this might
be sufﬁcient. Otherwise, the domestic ﬁnancial system
will be vulnerable to speculative attack and unantici-
pated shocks.
This is not to say that there are no beneﬁts associated
with dollarization. Currency risk vis-à-vis the new
medium of exchange is effectively eliminated, as are
any currency conversion costs and the need for hedg-
ing. It is important to realize, however, that in a world
11.    This happened in Argentina after it slipped into a recession in the late
1990s following a series of negative external shocks. Most of the adjustment
came through price deﬂation—a very slow and painful process, given that
labour markets in Argentina are quite rigid.  Ultimately, the process was too
slow, and Argentina was forced to abandon its currency board and allow its
currency to ﬂoat. (The concept of currency boards is discussed on p. 23.)23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
where the three major currencies—the U.S. dollar, the
Japanese yen, and the euro—continue to ﬂoat, any
emerging market that decides to tie itself to one of
them is, by deﬁnition, ﬂoating against the others. Any
currency risk and conversion costs related to the other
two currencies will therefore remain. For countries
like Panama, whose international trade is concen-
trated in one major country (the United States), this
does not pose a problem. For other countries with
more diversiﬁed trading patterns, such as Ecuador,
the implications could be serious. Both of these coun-
tries have dollarized, with differing degrees of suc-
cess. While Ecuador’s decision to adopt the dollar is
quite recent, the results to date have not been encour-
aging. Panama’s experience with dollarization goes
back to 1904 and has, by most accounts, been more
favourable.12
In a world where the three major
currencies—the U.S. dollar, the
Japanese yen, and the euro—continue
to ﬂoat, any emerging market that
decides to tie itself to one of them is,
by deﬁnition, ﬂoating against the
others.
Some of these problems can be avoided by establishing
a currency board as opposed to dollarizing. A currency
board involves a ﬁrm commitment, often embedded
in legislation or even in the country’s constitution, to
permanently ﬁx the external value of the domestic
currency to another country’s currency. In addition,
the emerging economy promises to make its domestic
currency and the foreign currency freely convertible.
In order to ensure the credibility of the regime, the
emerging economy also promises to tie the domestic
money base to its reserve holdings of foreign currency.
This arrangement shares many of the features of full
dollarization, except that the domestic currency con-
tinues to circulate, thereby allowing the emerging
economy to keep its seigniorage. A currency board
system is also somewhat easier to reverse or exit than
12. Edwards (2001) presents a much less positive picture for Panama and for
most other countries that have either dollarized or set up currency boards.
a fully dollarized system. The last feature can prove
something of a handicap, however, and can under-
mine the credibility of the arrangement, especially in
the midst of a ﬁnancial crisis.13 The recent experience
of Argentina suggests that the protection provided by
a currency board can indeed be very limited.
Fear of ﬂoating
If hard ﬁxes are not the answer, perhaps a freely ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate might represent a more promising
alternative. Unfortunately, post–war experience with
freely floating exchange rates indicates that this extreme
arrangement can also suffer from certain deﬁciencies,
at least in the context of emerging markets. Some
observers, in fact, have suggested that very few econo-
mies—either industrial or emerging–—truly ﬂoat.14
As discussed earlier, many of the countries that are
ofﬁcially classiﬁed as operating under a ﬂexible
exchange rate display an evident fear of ﬂoating. They
regularly intervene to help stabilize their exchange
rate and appear willing to subvert other domestic
objectives, such as price stability and full employ-
ment, in order to maintain a particular exchange rate
level. Moreover, the problems seem more severe, and
the deviations from true ﬂexibility more egregious, in
the case of emerging-market economies. Observed
movements in the exchange rates of supposed “floaters”
are often similar in size and general behaviour to
countries operating under a pegged exchange rate,
and in some instances display even less variability.
The reasons for this fear of ﬂoating can be linked to
three factors, according to Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
The ﬁrst factor is a deep-seated distrust of markets,
which many emerging-market economies believe
move in perverse and unpredictable ways. The second
factor is that depreciations in these countries tend to
be associated with economic contractions rather than
expansions. Instead of stabilizing growth and employ-
ment in response to an external shock, therefore, the
resulting exchange rate movements tend to  exacer-
bate the pressures, leading to more severe economic
dislocation. This is due in part to the absence of a credi-
blemechanism, such as an inﬂation target, with which
to anchor expectations.15 In addition, a signiﬁcant
13.    A currency board can also raise risks for ﬁnancial stability, since there is
a reduced incentive to hedge foreign currency positions under such a regime.
Should the currency board collapse, this currency mismatch can cause serious
problems, as in Argentina.
14.   See Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
15.    See Laidler (1999, 2002).24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
portion of government and private sector debt in
many of these economies is often denominated in a
foreign currency, causing debt-servicing costs to rise
every time the domestic currency depreciates. The
third factor concerns the demonstrated inability of
many emerging economies to conduct effective, coun-
tercyclical monetary policies. In many cases, the mon-
etary policy independence that a ﬂoating exchange
rateconfershassimplyledtochronicinflation.Monetary
conditions tend to tighten, therefore,  in reaction to
any economic weakness or exchange rate depreciation,
rather than easing to help offset the shock.16
Since ﬂoating exchange rates are perceived as offering
few beneﬁts in terms of effective macroeconomic insu-
lation, Calvo and Reinhart argue that it is natural for
emerging-market economies to place greater impor-
tance on exchange rate stabilization. The sizable gains
realized through lower transactions costs and reduced
currency risk in these open economies are believed to
easily outweigh any advantages that might be real-
ized from enhanced policy independence. Indeed, the
latter is often regarded as a cost rather than a beneﬁt.
If pegged exchange rates have a checkered history and
lead to inevitable collapse, and the extremes of fully
ﬁxed or freely ﬂoating exchange rates are considered
problematic, what viable alternatives do emerging
markets have? Is there any exchange rate regime that
might be regarded as either desirable or feasible?
New intermediate solutions
Two proposals have recently been advanced for
emerging-market economies that try to overcome the
problems noted above. Both involve a return to the
middle and try to provide a degree of policy and
exchange rate ﬂexibility along with greater exchange
market stability.
Baskets, bands, and crawling pegs
The ﬁrst proposal, baskets, bands, and crawling pegs
(BBC), is most closely associated with Williamson
(2000) and is actually a synthesis and extension of
some ideas that he and others promoted in the 1970s
and early 1980s. It consists of three key elements. The
first is similar in spirit to the failed Bretton Woods
system, but with one important difference. Each
emerging market under the Williamson proposal
would be encouraged to peg its currency to a basket of
foreign currencies, as opposed to the currency of a sin-
gle trading partner. This element is expected to reduce
16.    The term “monetary conditions” refers to the combined effect of the
exchange rate and interest rates on economic activity.
the tensions that invariably arise when the major cur-
rencies begin to move in opposite directions.
As part of the second element, emerging markets
would be asked to ensure that their pegged exchange
rates stayed within a set of symmetric, and reasonably
wide, bands. This is designed to provide the market
with some guidance as to the allowable limits of
exchange rate movements, while giving the central
bank a fair degree of monetary independence, provided
the exchange rate is well within the bands. How pro-
tective or aggressive the central bank wants to be in
defending the bands would be up to the authorities,
but some ﬂexibility might be encouraged in order to
avoid the sort of destabilizing one-way speculation
that characterized the Bretton Woods system.
The third element in Williamson’s proposal concerns
the midpoint of the target band, which would be
allowed to crawl gradually over time, reﬂecting the
authorities’ best judgment about the fundamental
forces that might be driving the real exchange rate.
This “crawling peg” would help relieve the tensions
that might otherwise arise, owing to shifting funda-
mentals, and give the market some useful medium-
term guidance as to where the exchange rate might be
expected to go, thereby preventing persistent mis-
alignments.
Critics suggest that, while the BBC proposal sounds
good in theory, it would inevitably confront many of
the same problems that plagued the Bretton Woods
system and all its latter-day variants. Decisions con-
cerning the appropriate midpoint of the band and the
future level of the crawling peg are inherently difﬁ-
cult, in the absence of any reliable model of the forces
that determine the equilibrium exchange rate. Moreo-
ver, the same issues of one-way speculation and difﬁ-
cult policy choices would have to be dealt with as
soon as the exchange rate approached the upper or
lower limits of the band. Softening the commitment to
defend these bands might reduce these pressures, but
at the risk of increasing market uncertainty about
where the authorities thought the rate should be and
what action they were prepared to take once the limits
were reached. In the limit, the system would simply
revert to a loosely managed ﬂoat—little different than
what many of the emerging markets already have.
Only a few countries, such as Chile, Colombia, and
Israel, have successfully employed a system similar to
the BBC. In all three cases, however, it served simply
as a transition to a more ﬂexible system based on inﬂa-
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Managed ﬂoating plus
Goldstein (2002) has also championed a new exchange
rate system for emerging markets, called managed
ﬂoating plus, or MFP. This system approaches the
problem from a slightly different angle than William-
son’s BBC, but shares many of its objectives. Like the
BBC, the MFP tries to identify a viable middle ground
that would give the monetary authorities some policy
independence, while eliminating (or at least moderat-
ing) some of the excessive volatility that might other-
wise be associated with a completely free ﬂoat.
Monetary authorities . . . would still
be allowed to intervene in the foreign
exchange market and manage the
external value of their currency, but
only to the extent that their actions
did not compromise the achievement
of their inﬂation objective.
Unlike the BBC proposal, which gives prominence to
the exchange rate, the MFP proposal uses a domestic
inﬂation target as the nominal anchor for monetary
policy and gives greater attention to stabilizing the
domestic economy than to ﬁxing the exchange rate.
Monetary authorities, under Goldstein’s proposal,
would still be allowed to intervene in the foreign
exchange market and manage the external value of
their currency, but only to the extent that their actions
did not compromise the achievement of their inﬂation
objective. Whenever a conﬂict arose between these
two objectives, exchange rate considerations would be
forced to give way to domestic price stability.
To minimize the problems of excessive asset-price vol-
atility and vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises, emerging-
market economies would be encouraged to establish
comprehensive reporting systems to monitor the level
of outstanding public and private debt and the extent
of foreign currency exposure. Greater effort would
also be made in the context of an MFP to promote the
development of domestic capital markets and reduce
the economy’s dependence on foreign currency
borrowing. In addition, emerging markets would
be advised to take a measured approach to capital-
market liberalization, leaving some capital controls in
place until an adequate supervisory and regulatory
infrastructure had been established. This sequential
strategy to market opening would limit exposure to
external shocks and sudden changes in investor senti-
ment. Capital controls would be treated as a tempo-
rary and regrettable expedient, however, and not as a
permanent feature of the economy.
Beyond the acceptance of capital controls as a neces-
sary short-term palliative, Goldstein’s MFP  seems to
bear a close resemblance to the ﬂoating-rate system
many industrialized countries currently have in place.
Pure ﬂoats, as Calvo and Reinhart have correctly
observed, are the exception rather than the rule. Many
ﬂoaters regularly intervene. The only thing that differ-
entiates them from other, more actively managed
regimes is the frequency and scope of their interven-
tions. In the extreme, of course, the MFP becomes
indistinguishable from the BBC—it is simply a ques-
tion of how much emphasis the exchange rate is
given. The two intermediate proposals start from
opposite ends of the spectrum of exchange rate
systems, but can be deﬁned in such a way that they
essentially overlap.
Conclusions
For an emerging market that is integrated with global
ﬁnancial markets, neither of the two exchange rate
extremes seems to offer an attractive alternative.
While the major industrialized countries have indi-
cated a marked preference for either strong ﬁxes or
free ﬂoats, both of these solutions pose serious prob-
lems for countries with less-developed ﬁnancial mar-
kets, limited credibility, and rudimentary supervisory
systems. On the other hand, traditional pegged
exchange rates based on a ﬁxed parity and narrow
ﬂuctuation bands have been shown to be inherently
unstable and an open invitation to speculative attacks.
The most promising alternatives for most emerging
markets would therefore seem to be the two new
intermediate schemes. This is not to suggest that they
are equally attractive, however. The MFP exchange
rate regime would have to be viewed as the more
promising because it combines the desirable features
of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime (i.e., monetary pol-
icy independence and shock-absorbing properties)
with a framework designed to address the major prob-
lems that have complicated the implementation of
such a regime in emerging markets (i.e., lack of a nom-
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movements). In addition, this type of regime has
already had some early success with countries such
as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and South Africa. Currency
boards and dollarization are mostly useful as a last
resort for countries suffering from original sin or too
small to be able to have their own currency. Monetary
union is a possibility for a few emerging markets,
mainly the transition economies in Europe, but this set
is rather small. Other options, such as the BBC
exchange rate regime, might also be useful, but only
as a transition regime, and should only be adopted
with a clear exit strategy in mind.
In closing, it is worth emphasizing that no exchange
rate system is best for all countries or for all times, and
that no regime can act as a substitute for good policies
and strong institutions. Indeed, the exchange rate
regime should be viewed as part of a coherent mone-
tary order, which is itself an integral part of a sound
macroeconomic framework.
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